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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUARANTY NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
BARBARA J. MORRIS, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 16207 
This case arose out of a settlement for 
personal injuries received by defendant/appellant, 
hereinafter referred to as "defendant", in which 
plaintiff/respondent, hereinafter referred to as "plain-
tiff", claimed a right to full reimbursement for no-
fault benefits it paid to defendant by way of Personal 
Injury Protection payments (hereinafter referred to as 
P.I.P.), without any responsibility for a proportionate 
share of the attorneys' fees and costs incurred by 
defendant in securing that settlement. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted plaintiff's Motion 
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for Summary Judgment (R. 12-13) and denied defendant's 
corresponding Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 16-17) on 
the basis that plaintiff had " •.• no obligation to 
the defendant . . • for attorneys' fees or costs with 
respect to the subrogated interests asserted by (plain-
tiff) . . for the no-fault payment and benefits paid 
to ... (defendant)." (R. 84). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the order 
granting Summary Judgment to plaintiff and an entry of 
Summary Judgment in defendant's favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter was submitted to the lower court 
upon a Stipulation of Facts and Exhibits (R. 52-81) 
which properly reflect the facts material to a deter-
mination of this matter. Summarizing those items, 
defendant was injured in an auto accident on December 
16, 1975, by an individual insured by State Farm Insu-
rance Company (hereinafter referred to as "State Farm"). 
Following that accident, plaintiff paid 
defendant $2,787.61 in no-fault insurance benefits and 
notified State Farm of its claim for reimbursement of 
those benefits on June 24, 1976 (R. 74). On November 
-2-
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9, 1976, plaintiff was advised by State Farm that 
defendant had obtained the services of an attorney and 
that its subrogation demand could not be considered 
until defendant's liability claim had been resolved (R. 
75). On February 22, 1977, State Farm advised plaintiff 
of the name of defendant's attorney and that negotia-
tions were still pending (R. 76). On December 22, 
1977, defendant executed a release and settled with 
State Farm for $14,000.00 prior to filing suit, which 
release specifically provided that, in return for the 
amount paid, the defendant "releases and forever dis-
charges" State Farm's insureds, "none of whom admit any 
liability to the undersigned but all expressly deny any 
liability" (R. 77). 
Pursuant to plaintiff's asserted subrogation 
rights as provided in the insurance contract (R. 73, 75 
and 80-P.I.P. Endorsement, Section 1. Conditions, 
paragraphs (d) and (e) ) , two checks were issued by 
State Farm in connection with the settlement: one 
payable to defendant and her attorney in the sum of 
$11,212.39; and one payable to plaintiff and defendant's 
attorney in the sum of $2,787.61 (R. 77). On January 
6, 1978, defendant's attorney advised plaintiff of 
the settlement and that the no-fault payments, to be 
paid out of the $1~.000.00 settlement, pGrsuant to 
-3-
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plaintiff's subrogation claim, would be subject to a 
regular l/3 contingency fee of $928.27 as its propor-
tionate share of the attorneys' fees, which fee was 
based upon the contingency fee agreement executed 
between defendant and her attorneys. (R. 78-79). 
Plaintiff denied responsibility for any 
attorneys' fees or costs relative to the amounts 
recovered in its behalf (R. 80-81) and brought this 
action for a declaration that it was not responsible 
for such fees and for a release of any claim by defen-
dant to those funds (R. 1-3). Defendant answered and 
by way of Counterclaim, asserted her rights to have 
plaintiff bear its proportionate share of the attorney's 
fees and costs of $928.27 (R. 9-10). Motions for 
Summary Judgment based upon these facts, were filed by 
both parties and, after a hearing thereon without a 
transcript, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, entered 
an Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and denying defendant's corresponding Motion. It 
is from that Order that defendant appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD NO OBLIGA-
TION TO DEFENDANT FOR ATTORNEYS' 
-4-
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FEES OR COSTS WITH RESPECT TO THE 
SUBROGATED INTERESTS ASSERTED. 
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts, 
prior to any settlement, plaintiff was aware that a 
claim was being made by defendant against State Farm's 
insured and that its subrogation claim would not be 
considered until that claim had been determined. Yet, 
plaintiff took no action whatsoever to aid in the pro-
secution of defendant's claim or even to prosecute its 
own claim, choosing, instead, to await the outcome of 
defendant's efforts. Nor did plaintiff, at any time, 
suggest to defendant, or her attorneys, that they 
should not make any claim for the $2,787.61 for which 
plaintiff sought reimbursement. Only after the neces-
sary expenditure of work, labor, and effort by defen-
dant and her attorneys to secure the recovery did 
plaintiff make demand for the full amount of its 
subrogation claim, without any off-set for the attor-
neys' fees or other expenses incurred in securing those 
monies. Plaintiff now claims that no such fees are 
provided for in the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act, §31-41-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), and, 
therefore, may not be allowed. That Section provides: 
(1) Every insurer authorized to write the 
insurance required by this act shall agree as a 
-5-
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condition to being allowed to continue to write 
insurance in the State of Utah: 
(a) That where its insured is or 
would be held legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
~equired under this act have been paid by another 
~nsurer, including the state insurance fund, it 
will reimburse such other insurer for the payment 
of such benefits, but not in excess of the amount 
of damages so recoverable, and 
(b) That the issue of liability 
for such reimbursement and the amount of same 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration 
between the insurers. Id. 
While it is true, as plaintiff contends, that 
no attorney's fees are provided for in that section, it 
must also be noted that no "subrogation" is provided 
for either. 
That section contemplates only arbitration 
between insurance companies as does the act itself. 
The plaintiff, rather than taking his chances pursuant 
to the artibration provisions referred to, chose 
instead to proceed under its contractual subrogation 
rights (R. 76, 78, 79, 80, 81) by asserting a lien upon 
any recovery secured by the defendant. By doing this 
the provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insu-
rance Act, Supra., then become inapplicable and basic 
equitable principles of subrogation should be looked to 
as controlling. 
The right of subrogation is an equitable 
-6-
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principle, designed to prevent a plaintiff from reco-
vering twice, once from the company insuring her and 
once from the company insuring the tort-feasor, thereby 
preventing an unjust enrichment of the insured. 
Needless to say, the plaintiff now argues that it is 
entitled to money for which it made no effort to obtain 
recovery and for which it paid none of the expenses of 
recovery. To allow the defendant to recover its total 
expenditures without bearing its fair share of the 
expenses of recovery would truly constitute unjust 
enrichment and is most certainly contrary to the prin-
ciples of equity. 
This proposition has continuously been admit-
ted by fair-minded insurance companies. In the case of 
Transamerica Insurance Co. vs. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 
505 P.2d 783 (1972), (a case whose facts and issues are 
quite similar to this case), the insurer-plaintiff 
openly admitted that it owed the defendant-insured for 
the costs of recovery. 
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to reim-
bursement to the extent of $1,000.00 less a 
reasonable attorney's fee and its proportionate 
share of the costs from the fund recovered by 
defendant from the tort-feasors. Id. at 785 · 
Plaintiff believes that this is the only reasonable and 
honest solution to the question of distribution of 
-7-
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settlement proceeds between an insured and a subrogated 
insurer. 
The law in this area is clearly set forth in 
44 Am.Jur.2d, §1845 and §1846: 
The general rule is that the insured may 
retain out of the fund recovered from the 
wrongdoer, after the payment of the policy, 
the costs and reasonable expenses incurred in 
the litigation, for it would be unjust to 
re uire him to incur e enses for the 
recovery of money for the benef1t o the 
insurer, without being allowed to reimburse 
himself. Id. 
This same general rule is expressed in an 
annotation "Attorney's Fee- Recovery From Insurer", 2 
ALR.3d 1441. The annotation states that: 
In the cases which hold that the subrogated 
property insurer is obligated to pay a fee to 
the insured's attorney, who recovered damages 
from a third party, the courts generally rely 
on general equitable principles, and, in some 
cases, point out that the insurer did not 
participate in the action against the third 
party. Id. at 1443. 
With respect to the minority position, where 
the right to a fee is denied, the same annotation 
states: 
A very few cases which hold or indicate that 
an insured's attorney was not entitled to a 
fee out of that part of the recovery from the 
tort-feasor belonging to the insurance car-
rier, have been found. These decisions rest 
on asserted principles of equity, or on the 
fact that the property insurer participated 
and assisted in the recovery, or at least 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
attempted to do so. 2 ALR.3d 1145-1146. 
Plaintiff's lack of assistance and partici-
pation in the recovery is admitted and, therefore, 
plaintiff does not fall within the confines of the 
minority rule. On the contrary, under the equitable 
considerations of the majority rule, plaintiff must 
bear a pro-rata share of the attorneys' fees and 
expenses incurred by defendant in recovering the monies 
at issue. 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Elkins, 451 SW.2d 528 (1970), the trial court allowed 
the insured to deduct a pro-rata share of the attorney's 
fees and expenses from the portion of the judgment 
which accrued to the insurer's benefit under its sub-
rogation rights. In affirming the trial court's 
decision, the appellate court stated: 
The principle that the insurer can 
recover payments made to the insured, after 
insured recovers from the tort-feasor is 
based upon equity and that the insurance is a 
contract of indemnity. Hayward v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 
500, 4 NVJ.2d 316, 140 A.I..R. 1236 (1942); 
Manley v. Montgomery Bus Co., 82 Pa.Super. 
530 (1924); Home Ins. Co. v. Slater, 28 
Del. Co. R. (Pa.) 546 (1939); Cedarholm v. 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Companies, 81 
Idaho 136, 338 P.2d 93 (1959); Natlonal 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 
153 NY/. 2d 152 (1967). 
In the above cited cases, where the 
insurer has recovered aaainst the insured, 
-9-
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the ro-rata cost and e 
~nsured ~n obta~n~ng t e money are rne 
b~ the insurer. Camden Fire Ins. Ass 1 n v. 
M~ssouri K & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, SUfla; 
Hayward v. State Farm Mutual Automob~ e 
Insurance Companies, hupd?· The proceeds 
owed to the insurer w o ~d not assist in 
their collection, must bear the cost and 
expense of their collection. (Emphasis 
added). 4~1 aw.2d at 531-32. 
See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. W.P. Rose 
Supply Co., 19 N.C.App. 302, 198 SE.2d 482 (1973), 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Clinton, 518 
P.2d 645 (Ore. 1974). 
A similar result was reached in Cedarholm 
v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Companies, 81 Idaho 136, 
338 P.2d 93 (1959). A husband and wife, injured in an 
automobile accident, brought an action against the 
tort-feasor after being partially reimbursed by their 
insurer. A settlement was reached, and (similar to the 
present factual situation), two checks were delivered 
by the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs then 
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to have 
the draft made out to the respondent-insurer turned 
over to them. The respondent-insurer claimed the full 
amount under its subrogation rights. The Idaho Supreme 
Court ruled that: 
Recovery by the respondent under its 
right of subrogation, however, is subject to 
reduction by the amount appellants expended 
for collection. 
-10-
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The general rule is that the insured may 
retain out of the fund recovered from the 
wrongdoer, after the payment of the policy, 
the costs and reasonable expenses incurred in 
the litigation, for it would be unjust to 
require him to incur expenses for the reco-
very of money for the benefit of the insurer, 
without being allowed to reimburse himself. * 
* * 338 P.2d at 96. 
It is clear that the courts throughout the 
nation have held that an insured is entitled to recover 
from his insurer a pro-rata share of his attorney's 
fees and expenses incurred in an action against the 
tort-feasor where the insurer was subrogated to a 
portion of the amount recovered. (See also Iowa 
National Mutual Insurance Company v. Huntley, 328 P.2d 
569 (Wyo. 1958); Commercial Standard Insurance Company 
of Ft. Worth Texas v. Combs, 460 &W.2d 770 (Ark., 
1970); Krause v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 
184 Neb. 588, 169 NW.2d 601 (Neb., 1969); and Carter v. 
Wooley, 521 P.2d 793 (Okla., 1974) ) . 
This court has dealt with the relationship of 
subrogation rights and equity in the case of Transamerica 
Insurance Co. v. Barnes, supra. In that case, this 
court established the guidelines that should apply to 
this case: 
Equitable principles apply to subrogation, 
and the insured is entitled to be made whole 
before the insurer may recover any portion of 
the recovery from the tort-feasor. If the 
-11-
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one responsible has paid the full extent of 
the loss, the insurer should not claim both 
sums, and the insurer may then assert its 
claims to subrogation. Subrogation is not a 
matter of right, but may be invoked only in 
those circumstances where justice demands its 
applications, and the rights of the one 
seeking subrogation have a greater equity 
than the one who opposes him. Subrogation is 
not permitted where it will work any injus-
tice to others. To entitle one to subroga-
tion, the equities of one's case must be 
strong, as equity will, in general, relieve 
only those who could not have relieved 
themselves. Id. at 786. 
Thus, while the plaintiff may be entitled to 
recover the P.I.P. payments paid to defendant under 
a subrogation theory, it must, equitably, bear its 
proportionate share of the expenses incurred by defen-
dant in recovering those payments from the tort-fea-
sor's insurance company. 
Plaintiff's claim that it was required to 
arbitrate under the facts of this case completely 
misconceives the basic purpose of the No-Fault Act, 
supra. It is clear that its arbitration provisions 
were meant only to apply to a simple matter in which 
all expenses incurred by the insured in an accident do 
not exceed $500.00 and have been paid by the insurer, 
and the only reconciliation to be reached was between 
the two insurance companies. (A settlement which in no 
way affects the rights of the insured). The same pro-
visions are clearly inadequate to handle the equitable 
-12-
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considerations which arise when the insurer is only 
required to pay a small portion of the total damages 
incurred by the insured, and the insured then is forced 
to take action, by way of suit or otherwise, to recover 
from the tort-feasor his total damages and concom-
mitantly to protect her own rights as well as the 
subrogation rights of the insurer. When this happens, 
the principles of subrogation become operative and the 
arbitration provisions of the No-Fault Act, supra., 
become inoperative. 
In either event, plaintiff's rights are pro-
tected. If plaintiff's expenditures on behalf of the 
insured are the only damages sustained by the insured, 
plaintiff may then arbitrate with the tort-feasor's 
insurance company to recover the amount it expended. 
If the insured has sustained damage in addition to the 
amounts expended by plaintiff, then plaintiff may 
recover those amounts under the subrogation rights 
specifically reserved by plaintiff in the P.I.P. 
insurance policy (R. 73). The presence of a subro-
gation clause in plaintiff's own P.I.P. policy is 
clearly indicative of the fact that even plaintiff 
anticipated subrogation situations would occur in 
connection with the payment of P.I.P. benefits. 
-13-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
By relying on the No-Fault Act's requirement 
of mandatory arbitration, plaintiff is simply trying to 
take back the entire amount which was paid to its 
insured under a paid for contract of insurance without 
having to share in the labor, efforts, expenses, and 
risks incurred in collecting such amounts. 
A direct parallel can be drawn between the 
present case, its applicable statutory guidelines, and 
an analogous area of the law concerning workmen's com-
pensation. Under the Utah Workmen's Compensation laws, 
§31-1-1, et ~· Utah Code Anno. (1953), the extent to 
which the employee-claimant can recover, and the con-
text within which he can bring suit to recover from the 
third party-tort-feasor involved is all a matter of 
statutory regulation. Yet in this area, given a 
situation wherein the employee-claimant brings suit to 
recover his damages from the negligent third party, the 
Utah statutes expressly provide that a reasonable 
attorney's fee shall be awarded for the efforts of the 
employee-claimant's attorney. See §35-1-62(2), Utah 
Code Anno. (1953). 
In interpreting the Workman's Compensation 
statute, supra., this court has stated that the reason-
able expenses of the action, including contingent 
-14-
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attorney's fees, should be paid and charged proportion-
ately against the parties (the injured employee and the 
insurer) as their interests appear. 
This equitable doctrine was first ennunciated 
by the Utah Supreme Court in a well-reasoned opinion 
in the case of Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 
16 U.2d 80, 426 P.2d 223 (1967), and has been repeatedly 
cited in the workmen's compensation area as the control-
ling law. 
The Worthen doctrine, supra., was followed in 
a later workmen's compensation case, Lanier v. Pyne, 29 
U.2d 249, 508 P.2d 38 (1973). In Lanier, the insurance 
company attempted the same agrument that defendant is 
now making and contended that it had not hired the 
plaintiff's attorneys and should not be required to 
bear a proportionate share of the attorney's fees and 
costs incurred. The court responded as follows: 
However, by indulging in a process of 
rationalization, and by following a procedure 
presently to be stated, Liberty Mutual 
(insurer of the injured employee) contends 
that notwithstanding the amendment, it is 
still not obliged to bear any portion of 
plaintiff's attorney's fees. This contention 
is based on the following propositions: that 
by reason of its right of subrogation, it 
properly intervened in the actlon; that 
inasmuch as it would be required to pay 
attorney's fees, it should be privileged to 
choose its own attorneys; that it notified 
the plaintiff and his attorneys that it did 
not desire their representation; and that its 
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own attorneys would protect its interests 
Liberty Mutual does not disagree with the. 
cases above referred to, but asserts that 
this one is different because in none of them 
doe7 it appear that the plaintiff was put on 
not~ce, as he was here, that the insurance 
carrier had hired its own counsel and would 
protect its own interest. It thus raises 
what it asserts to be the sole issue in this 
case: that when it has thus hired its own 
counsel and given such notice, it is not 
required to participate in proportional 
payment of the costs and attorney's fees 
incurred by the plaintiff. 
Considerations of reason and policy 
impel the conclusion that the plaintiff, 
the one who has suffered the injury and 
damage, should have basic ownership and 
control of his cause of action. It is most 
natural to suppose that he w~ll try to obtain 
the maximum possible recovery. Id. at 39-40. 
(Emphasis Added.) 
The plaintiff respectfully asserts that the 
equitable considerations in these two areas of the law 
are identical with regard to the rights of an insured 
to recover for his total losses and the rights of the 
insurer to be subrogated to this recovery to the extent 
of any amounts paid to the insured by his insurer. It 
is clear that the insurer in both situations should 
rightfully bear a portion of the expenses incurred by 
the injured parties in recovering a fund from which 
both parties will share. 
The defendant acknowledges plaintiff's rights 
to be subrogated to the recovery by her to the extent 
of the payments for special damages made by her insurer 
-16-
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to her. It is equally clear under the general rules of 
law and equity and the majority of decisions hold that 
the plaintiff herein is liable for a pro-rata share of 
the expenses incurred, including attorney's fees, in 
recovering the amounts to which it is entitled. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETER-
MINING THAT, IF SECTION 31-41-11 
UTAH CODE ANNO. (1953), AS AMENDED, 
PRECLUDES DEFENDANT'S RECOVERY OF 
A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS IN THIS MATTER, SUCH 
PROVISION WOULD NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 
I, SEC. 11, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
The plaintiff has completely misconceived the 
basis of the defendant's causes of action and the 
language and effect of the Utah No-Fault Act, supra. 
The plaintiff claims that the No-Fault Act prohibits a 
suit to recover its interest and specifically limits it 
to binding arbitration. 
Such an interpretation of the Act would 
render it unconstitutional on the grounds that it woulC 
violate an injured party's constitutional rights of due 
process of la~ and equal protection under the laws, 
under both the state and federal Constitutions. 
Particularly applicable is the due process provision of 
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Article I, Sec. 11; of the Constitution of Utah: 
Sec. 11. All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by him-self or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
Under the interpretation of the No-Fault Act 
asserted by the plaintiff, the only damages for which 
the defendant could bring an action would be those in 
excess of any amounts already paid to her by her insurer. 
Apparently, plaintiff would then assert that it alone 
has the right to seek reimbursement for the damages it 
has paid, through the binding, compulsory arbitration 
called for under the Act. 
This entire characterization of the process 
of adjudication proposed by the plaintiff is directly 
contrary to the requirement in Utah law, as well as in 
a majority of jurisdictions, that a single cause of 
action may not be split. The general rule on splitting 
causes of action is discussed in 140 ALR 1245 and 1 
Am.Jur.2d 651. In Cedarloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 
169 P.2d 777 (1946), this court dealt with the splitting 
of a cause of action and stated: 
even though the insurance company 
is subrogated to a part of the claim of the 
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plaintiff, against the defendant, that does 
not create another cause of action and there 
can only be one suit to recover on that cause 
of action. 169 P.2d at 780. 
See also Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 
152 P.2d 98 (1944), and Rayner v. Hi-Line Transport, 
Inc., 15 U.2d 427, 394 P.2d 383 (1964). 
The defendant is entitled to bring an action 
for the full damages incurred, including those for 
which it received partial payment from her insurer. 
The defendant would then naturally anticipate that her 
insurer would receive payment, under its subrogation 
rights, for the amount it had paid to her less its 
proportionate share of the expenses incurred in bring-
ino the act1on. This would insure that neither party 
would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the other. 
To require her to commence an action in any other 
manner would violate her constitutional rights to a 
full and total adjudication of her claim. 
There is still another line of reasoning 
under which the plaintiff'a assertions violate the 
de~endant's constitutional rights. If an injured party 
were precluded fro~ !-'resenting evidence of medical, 
hospital and other expenses simply because she had been 
reimbursed for her e'penditures, such a law would 
violate her riGhts because it 1,·ould den~· her "remedy by 
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due course of law" and would deprive her of her pro-
perty without due process of law. If a plaintiff were 
precluded from introducing evidence of doctor's bills, 
hospital and drug expenses, and other insurable losses, 
she would effectively be precluded from presenting the 
most effective evidence of her damage and would most 
likely receive less than that to which she was right-
fully entitled. 
Defendant, therefore, respectfully asserts 
that certain provisons of the Utah No-Fault Act supra., 
and specifically those under Section 31-41-11, supra., 
relative to the mandatory, binding arbitration between 
the insurers, is unconstitutional in its effect upon 
the defendant, if it is to be interpreted as claimed by 
the plaintiff. Application of those provisions, as 
interpreted by the plaintiff would violate the defen-
dant's constitutional rights in that they would deny 
her "remedy by due course of law" and would deprive her 
of her property without due process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to have plaintiff bear 
its fair share of the attorney's fees and costs expended 
in connection with securing a recovery of defendant's 
da~aoes and the amounts expended by plaintiff in 
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defendant's behalf. 
At no time until plaintiff's monies had been 
recovered by the defendant did plaintiff claim that 
it should not pay a proportionate share of those costs. 
Because subrogation principles are applicable 
to this case, as admitted by plaintiff in its conduct 
and in its insurance policy, plaintiff cannot now 
attempt to escape its responsibility to bear its pro-
portionate share of the burden by relying on the pro-
visions of a statute which is not applicable to the 
facts of this case. 
her favor. 
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment in 
DATED this 15th day of March, 1979. 
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